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ABSTRACT

The document examines the American public stand on foreign policy and explores the extent of citizen support for six basic foreign policy orientations--anti-Communism, internationalism, democracy, isolationism, interventionism, and self-interest. The extent of public support within these orientations among subgroups in the populace is also explored to see if age, education, and geographic location affect orientations. Major purposes are (1) to show how far the topics being debated among foreign policy experts have filtered into public consciousness, and (2) to provide insight into the limits of public opinion within which attempts to redefine national objectives can be maneuvered. A cross section of 300 citizens in each of 5 cities--Pittsburgh, San Francisco, Portland, Minneapolis, and Milwaukee--were interviewed by telephone. Findings show that the public still supports an activist posture toward the rest of the world, i.e., trade with the Soviet Union, aid to Third World countries, and secret spying on other countries but stopping short of covert intervention in internal affairs of other countries. People under age 25 are far less cold-war-oriented in their views of the world than older people. Local "elites" in terms of educational attainment and occupational position differ widely from the rest of the public, being much less concerned about the threat of communism and far more supportive of an expanded world economy. Appendices contain questions and responses by city, tables showing differences in foreign policy attitudes by background factors, and perceptual maps of the world. (RM)

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THE PUBLIC LOOKS AT FOREIGN POLICY: A REPORT FROM FIVE CITIES

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John P. Robinson
John D. Holm

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The Charles F. Kettering foundation commissioned the five surveys examined in this report. The foundation's support has also made possible the comparative analysis of the data and the report's publication. The data were collected in San Francisco and Portland by the Field Institute, in Minneapolis by Custom Research Inc., in Milwaukee by the Institute of World Affairs of the University of Wisconsin/Milwaukee and in Pittsburgh by Guide-Post Research and Noble Interviewing.

The Field Institute of San Francisco was responsible for central processing of the data analyses in the five cities, and this report reflects the analytic research experience and contributions of its director at the time, Robert Heyer. The authors also wish to acknowledge the excellent criticisms and suggestions to earlier drafts by Phillips Ruopp, Janet Eckstein, Bernard Roshco, Everett Cataldo and Sidney Kraus; the in-depth field interview reports were prepared by Clifford Kelly and Floyd Shoemaker.

THE PUBLIC LOOKS AT FOREIGN POLICY: A REPORT FROM FIVE CITIES

During the Cold War, there was little question about the dominant priority of American foreign policy: it was to protect the United States and the Western World against the threat of Soviet or Communist aggression. Polls taken during that time indicated widespread public support for this policy, or even harder-line positions toward communist countries (Hero 1968). The events of the last ten years, however, have led many to question the validity of such a prevailing orientation.

Now, several competing policy orientations come into play. Besides our longstanding concern to thwart communist threats and to promote third world economic development, there are arguments from various public spokesmen for (1) isolating ourselves as much as possible from other countries and minimizing our military and political alliances, (2) concentrating our international relations more with democratic countries (i.e. Japan and Western Europe) and promoting democratic forms of government in other parts of the world, (3) investing more resources in the military and reasserting our power to settle international problems, and (4) more aggressive pursuit of American self-interest regardless of the ideological, cultural or political character of the countries involved.

Where does the American public stand on these increasingly complex issues in foreign policy? Do public attitudes continue to reflect cold war orientations, or has the public become unconcerned about the threat of communism? Have our feelings of moral responsibility to help the less fortunate withstood concern over our own faltering economy? Or have these views been replaced by isolationism, cynicism or belligerency?

This report of our extensive survey of public opinion on foreign policy will address itself to these and other critical questions.

We will also explore the extent to which there is overlap in citizen support for six basic foreign policy orientations — i.e. the two traditional ones of anti-communism and internationalism and the four less prominent orientations of democracy, isolationism, interventionism and self-interest. For instance, is it possible to view public opinion simply as anti-communist, pragmatic, or internationalist? Do people who take the "hard line" against communism also take a hard line against humanitarian foreign aid or the promotion of democratic reforms in other countries?

In addition, we will investigate the extent of public support for these different international orientations and belief

systems among important subgroups in the populace: Are young adults more open to internationalist positions than their elders? Can one accurately characterize people with more formal education as more sophisticated or cosmopolitan in terms of the foreign policy statements they espouse? Do people in different geographic areas have different orientations on foreign policy?

In addressing all these questions, our report should serve two purposes. First, it will provide some indication of how far the topics being debated among foreign policy experts have filtered into public consciousness, and on which groups each has had the greatest impact. Second, we can gain some insight into the limits of public opinion within which attempts to redefine our national objectives can be maneuvered and the groups to which such maneuvers are most or least likely to appeal.

We need first to outline briefly the sources of the data in this report. Attitude questionnaires were administered to a cross-section of 300 citizens in each of five cities, or a total sample of close to 1500 Americans in their various urban locations in the first four months of 1976. The five cities — Pittsburgh, San Francisco, Portland (Ore.), Minneapolis, and Milwaukee — were those chosen for "town meetings" on foreign policy run under the auspices of prominent local organizations concerned with international affairs at the request of the U.S. Department of State.

Prior to the town meeting in each city, a cross-section of citizens was interviewed by telephone. The interview was brief, lasting 10 to 20 minutes, but probed into a variety of aspects of American foreign policy. The results of these surveys (which were commissioned by the Charles F. Kettering Foundation) were presented at the "town meeting" in each city in order to contrast the views of the "man in the street" with the opinions expressed by participants at the meeting.

One important observation is in order prior to examining the survey results. The survey instrument was not designed as a comprehensive examination of public opinion, but as a general instrument for providing public input to the dynamic town meetings in each city. It served this function very well, but as with any telephone poll on public policy issues, there are limitations on question construction and wording. In addition, the focus of the questions was determined by the general agenda of the town meetings. Thus, specific current topics were given little or no attention, e.g., relations with European countries, the problems of southern Africa, the Arab-Israeli conflict. Only the sketchiest of background data were collected from each respondent, and we had no data on people's racial or ethnic background, occupation, political loyalties, or attitudes on domestic political issues. Nevertheless, the results of the survey do serve as a very large-scale pilot test for a full-scale investigation of national public opinion and they do raise significant questions that need to be addressed in such an investigation.

A greater appreciation of the context and meaning of these poll results was obtained from 40 in-depth interviews conducted with people selected at random from the city of Pittsburgh. These people were interviewed in their homes for one to two hours by interviewers skilled in eliciting the reasons behind people's attitudes, the important "why"

component seldom addressed in public opinion polls. While the overriding impression emerging from these interviews was the embarrassment respondents felt about their lack of information and interest in world affairs, we feel the verbatim statements provide as useful a picture of the state of public opinion as the poll results and we will introduce them where appropriate.

The responses to the full set of questions in the surveys for each of the five cities are arrayed in Appendix A. Tables showing differences in our six attitude areas by age, by education, by income, by sex, and by location are provided in Appendix B and will be referred to in the discussion. The specific questions and responses of the 1500 respondents across the five cities by each topic area — U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations, aid to third world countries, and the four general foreign policy values and goals — are contained in the next three sections devoted to each topic area separately.

All of our findings will be summarized and discussed in the concluding section. However, we think it will provide a useful perspective to list briefly here some of our major observations and conclusions:

- the need for policy makers to be aware of the heavy emphasis that most members of the public put on the value of national self-interest in foreign policy.
- the fact that the public still supports an activist posture toward the rest of the world, including not only trade with the Soviet Union and aid to third world countries but secret spying on other countries, including allies. This sense of activism falls short of support of our covert intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, however.
- the presence of a potentially disruptive "generation gap" in foreign policy in the public, with people under age 25 being far less cold-war oriented in their views of the world than older people but far more aware of differences between developed and less developed countries.
- the fact that local "elites," in terms of educational attainment and occupational position, appear to differ widely from the rest of the public in their foreign policy attitudes, being much less concerned about the threat of communism and far more supportive of an expanded world economy.
- the need for public opinion polls of foreign policy attitudes to move beyond closed-ended questions which fail to probe into the reasons behind people's attitudes in order to be useful to policy makers.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION

Evidence of cold war thinking is visible in the responses to our questions. The survey results shown in Table 1 reveal a public still wary of the Soviet Union and skeptical about the results of detente. When asked who has benefited from detente, more than ten times as many people felt that the Soviet Union had gained more than felt that the U.S. had. In response to the simple statement "We cannot trust the Russians," 59% of the respondents agreed compared to 31% who disagreed; 11% expressed no opinion on the question.

In addition, a large proportion (62%) of the people interviewed considered "Stopping the spread of communism" to be a very important goal of our foreign policy. Only three other goals rated higher than stopping communism — protecting the jobs of American workers, keeping world peace, and stopping world hunger.

This wariness carries over to some extent to military preparedness. Some 41% of our respondents felt U.S. military power should be kept well ahead of Soviet strength, while 46% felt we should stay even and only 7% were willing to let the Soviet Union attain any advantage. Significantly, however, only 24% of the respondents were willing to see our general military budget increased, compared with 38% who wanted to see the budget reduced (See Table 4). Thus there seems to be a substantial reluctance to translate desires for military superiority into practical budget support.

At the same time, the public maintains an optimistic stance about U.S.-Soviet relations in the future. Almost three times as many respondents felt relations were improving (26%) as felt they were getting worse (9%). Optimism was particularly evident on the issue of trade: over twice as many people (67%) favored trade with the Soviet Union than opposed it (28%). Of those who favored trade, the overwhelming majority opposed using it as leverage for democratic domestic reforms within the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, most people wanted this trade to be conducted on stricter terms than our trade with non-communist countries.

Background Differences

Noticeable divisions within the public are apparent with regard to the Soviet Union. We have analyzed these divisions according to an attitude index which combined responses to six of the Table 1 questions (noted with an asterisk) into a single score measuring attitudes toward the Soviet Union (see Appendix Table B1). We also subjected these data to a Multiple Classification Analysis, a statistical technique which adjusts the effects of single background predictors (e.g. age) for other related predictors (e.g. education, income).

Younger adults, i.e. those under age 25, had scores on this scale which reflected a significantly more trusting orientation, one much less concerned about the threat of international communism. They were also less supportive of increasing military strength.

To a lesser extent, these views were shared by people with more education. While the factors of age and education are, of course, somewhat interrelated, our more detailed statistical analysis indicated that the two factors operated independently of each other. In other words, it is not merely the fact that younger people are better educated that explains their more trusting attitudes. Of the two factors, age was the more important predictor of Soviet attitudes.

The differences between San Francisco residents and residents of the other four survey cities apparent in Appendix A were not simply due to the younger and better-educated character of that city. Younger and better-educated San Francisco residents were also less anti-Soviet than residents of comparable age and education in other cities. In other words, San Francisco appears to deserve its reputation as a "cosmopolitan" location. (We shall see that this difference exists in other international attitude areas examined later.)

No significant differences were found by sex or income. Women professed attitudes that were just as anti-Soviet as men's attitudes. While higher income individuals might have been expected to be less anti-Soviet because of their higher education, these differences were very slight, especially after adjustment for other factors.

In-Depth Interviews

Perhaps the most interesting, although contradictory, interview information in the 40 in-depth Pittsburgh interviews was obtained from questions dealing with Soviet-American relations. Much of the contradiction inherent in the responses stemmed from the conflict between practical economics on the one hand and a spirit of fair play on the other. Most dominant, however, was the dictum "Don't trust the Russians!" The great majority of respondents felt that the Soviets' major goal was the spread of communism throughout the world. At best, this meant the Soviets were out to demonstrate the "upper hand" whenever they could. More extreme sentiments included the "bleeding of our natural resources," "conquest of the world," or "they want whatever they can get from us without going to war or giving anything in return for it." In any number of ways, then, Russia was perceived as an imperialist country whose major purpose was world domination through the acquisition of territory, knowledge, and natural resources.

When asked why we cannot trust the Russians, respondents mentioned past agreement violations as the major reason for mistrust. Many times the reasons given were quite vague: "We haven't gotten anything from the Soviets" or "Russia doesn't live up to anything." Many people mentioned the SALT talks as a major reason for the mistrust: "The SALT talks are meaningless! Russia dictates them!" Interestingly, no one brought up the classic ideological arguments involved, or the post-World War II Soviet expansions into and domination of Eastern Europe. There simply remains a frequently undefinable "feeling" of deep mistrust, perhaps a residue of the above issues. That feeling, then, is that the Russians have not lived up to their word in the past, and therefore cannot be expected to do so in the future. It is seemingly a direct reaction to the Soviet Union

TABLE 1:
SURVEY ATTITUDE QUESTIONS
RELATED TO THE SOVIET UNION AND
RESPONSES OF THE TOTAL SAMPLE
(N=1500, or about 300 from
each of the five cities)

How important is stopping the spread of communism?

*Very Important.	61.9%
Somewhat Important	19.5
Unimportant	16.2
No Opinion, No Answer	2.4
	100.0

Do you agree or disagree with the statement "We cannot trust the Russians"?

*Agree	58.6
Disagree.	30.8
No Opinion, No Answer	10.6
	100.0

Do you feel relations with Russia are improving, getting worse, or are about the same as they have been?

Improving	33.1
About the Same	48.3
*Getting Worse	11.3
No Opinion, No Answer	7.3
	100.0

Which do you favor, American trade with Russia or no American trade with Russia?

Favor Trade	67.4
*No Trade/Qualified	28.4
No Opinion, No Answer	4.2
	100.0

(ASKED ONLY OF THOSE WHO FAVOR TRADE)

Should we look on trade with Russia strictly as a business deal or should we sell to Russia only if they agree to act more democratically at home or more peacefully abroad?

Business Only	46.3
They Should Agree to Act More Democratically	17.1
No Opinion, No Answer	4.1

(ASKED ONLY OF THOSE WHO FAVOR TRADE)

Should trade with Russia be on the *same* business terms as it is with non-communist countries, or should it be on *more strict* terms or *more liberal* terms?

More Strict/Cash	42.4
Same Terms/Depends.	16.4
More Liberal/Credit	5.7
No Opinion, No Answer	1.6

Who has benefited from detente?

Has Benefited U.S. More	2.9
Benefited Both Equally	39.8
*Has Benefited Russia More	42.0
No Opinion, No Answer	15.3
	100.0

How should U.S. military power compare with Russia?

*U.S. Keep Well Ahead	41.4
Keep Even With Russia	45.8
Allow Russia to Get Ahead	6.8
No Opinion, No Answer	5.9
	100.0

itself and not, consciously at least, part of a larger ideological fabric.

There was a small but significant minority who felt that the Soviet Union's foreign policy objectives were largely economic, concerned with increased trade with the West for food, knowledge, and technology. The reason given by this minority was quite practical: the Soviets were merely trying to improve their own lot in life. Their responses tended to be quite unemotional in nature, in contrast to the majority's belief that the U.S.S.R. was out to conquer the world.

Despite the strong feelings expressed about Soviet expansionism, most of our interviewees took a pragmatic approach on issues which allowed such an orientation. In effect, while there is no great love lost for the Russians, the American sense of pragmatism demands that we deal with the Russians, because, in short, they exist. Comments were made such as "We cannot afford to look the other way," and "The reality is that we *have* to deal with and improve relations with the Russians!"

At the same time the overwhelming response to the questions on detente was that the Soviet Union has worked it to their clear advantage. When asked *why* they felt this way or how they knew this, many reasons were given: "They want everything and don't give anything in return." "They got our wheat, didn't they?" "I don't know. They just *seem* to benefit more." "They always get what they want one way or the other. If detente will help them they'll use it." "They're getting it all — everything we rule on is to their benefit." "The African situation and the Arab situation." "Because Russia is stretching the truth in respect to arms." "They have taken a tougher stand and we concede."

In addition, many people believed that Americans have in the past bent over backwards to cooperate, but that we've been pushed too far and should now get tougher. They expressed the fear that by allowing the Soviets a relatively free hand in affairs such as the situation in Africa, we give Russia the opportunity to take advantage in other parts of the world. One respondent summed the problem up quite succinctly: "Detente is a farce because the Rus-

sians cannot be trusted! It is the United States that consistently concedes, and the Russians who consistently take." The wheat deal was brought up many times by respondents as an example of how we had been recently taken, and in terms of spontaneous remarks was the most often cited example of the folly of detente.

On the other hand, the main argument given for a continuation of detente was that it keeps us from fighting a war, and as long as communication channels are kept open, the likelihood for better relations remains important.

With regard to trade with the Soviet Union, the support was quite practical in nature, although a minority of responses were more concerned with human factors. Practical considerations included such responses as: "It will help the cash flow. We over-produce many times;" "It will prevent wasting surplus;" "It's good for the economy of the U.S.;" "We need the business too, as well as other countries;" or, "I think we have to trade with them . . . trade should be part of our overall strategy with them." A smaller number of reasons included the consideration of improved relations and understanding or as one person put it, "Who am I to say they can't trade? It's on their conscience if they mess up!"

The comments made by those who objected to trade with Russia reflected the fears and suspicions of the Soviets alluded to previously. One person felt that the goods we traded would improve their technology, and thus place the U.S. at a disadvantage. Several variations of that theme were expressed: "They are the enemy. We shouldn't trade with enemies and make their people stronger than ours." "There are too many people starving right here." "How do we know it wouldn't be for military purposes? Farmers and businessmen might go overboard . . . leaving us short." Or as one respondent stated: "I don't know nothin' 'bout Russia, so I say no!"

Despite their perception that the objective of Soviet foreign policy is world domination, then, Americans seem reluctant to "take a harder line" with the Soviets when our economy is involved. It appears that taking a harder line refers to military posture, and not economic sanctions.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE THIRD WORLD

America has recently encountered frustrations in dealing with third world countries. The prices of their raw materials and goods have risen steeply, they have openly confronted us at the United Nations, and they have criticized our intervention in Vietnam.

Yet a majority of Americans still support the general policy of aid to third world countries. Across the five cities, 51% said we should aid these countries, while 40% said we should not (Table 2).

There appears to be more solid support for foreign aid for those in greatest need. In contrast to the 71% who rated "stopping world hunger" as a very important foreign policy problem, only 36% rated "helping to raise the standard of living in less developed countries" as very important. The same preference for helping those most in need over helping those most likely to survive was found when respondents in the Pittsburgh survey were forced to choose between the two alternatives. While 27% of Pittsburgh respondents chose to help countries most likely to attain self-sufficiency eventually, 59% favored aid to countries in greatest need. It appears that aid given as charity has more public appeal than aid given for development.

On the question of how to pay for aid to the peoples with greatest food problems, far more support was given for direct contributions (e.g. private charities) than for increased income taxes or reductions in standard of living. This suggests that the public may be disenchanted with our government's methods of providing aid to other countries, possibly to the point that they would support turning aid management over to a non-governmental agency.

Despite the willingness to help third world countries, however, there is little agreement (32%) with the proposition that the U.S. exploits third world countries by failing to pay fair prices for their raw materials. However, about a quarter of the respondents expressed no opinion on the question.

Background Differences

Our more detailed statistical analysis of the attitude index showed that attitudes toward third world countries varied significantly by the age, education, and residential location of survey respondents (see Appendix Table B2).

Most positive or liberal attitudes were again found among people under age 25 and people with a college education. In the case of third world attitudes, however, differences across education levels were just as pronounced as differences among age groups.

As was also the case for Soviet attitudes, San Francisco residents took a significantly more liberal position than people in the other four cities. This again held true even

when the younger and better-educated character of the San Francisco sample was taken into account. Also, no important differences by sex and income were found for third world attitudes.

Not only were Soviet and third world attitudes related to the same background predictors, they were themselves significantly interrelated. In other words, people who took a more open or liberal stance toward relations with the Soviet Union were also more liberal in their orientation to third world countries, and people who took a hard line towards third world countries also took a hard line toward the Soviet Union.

However, this relation between "hard-line" attitudes was not consistent across all subgroups. The relationship was greatest among younger and better-educated respondents — the same groups who expressed the most liberal attitudes. On the other hand, the two attitudes were *negatively* related among older people with least education. Within this segment, then, support for aid may be based on its perceived ability to prevent Soviet expansion into the third world. Within the middle-aged and middle-educated there was no relation between Soviet and third world attitudes.

It is clearly misleading, then, to treat the public as a single entity on these two issues. Support for aid would appear to have different bases in different population groups, in addition to the wide differences in basic attitudes noted above. A consistent hard-line or soft-line approach on the two foreign policy issue areas would only appear to make sense to younger and better-educated people, and would be seen as contradictory by older, less-educated people.

In-Depth Interview Responses

If the most frequently mentioned belief or historical lesson in foreign policy in the Pittsburgh interviews was that "we cannot trust the Russians," the second strongest belief was that our aid to third world countries doesn't reach "the people;" it either goes to the leaders in that country or to people here in this country. Further working against support for aid was the third most spontaneously mentioned lesson: with all the money the United States has poured into other countries over the past thirty years, it has done little to earn the friendship of other countries. Indeed, as one respondent pointed out, "With all our aid, no one would come to *our* rescue."

Nonetheless, most people did believe they had some humanitarian responsibility to help third world countries. Economic development was the target area mentioned most often when respondents were asked what they would do if they were suddenly given the job of Secretary of State. Most people also specifically volunteered that we should not expect anything in return for aid given to third world countries. This basic sense of humanitarianism to all people in need may also have underlain respondents' preferences for aid given on the basis of need over aid given on the basis of self-sufficiency.

**TABLE 2: THIRD WORLD ATTITUDE
QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES
(N=1500)**

How important is stopping world hunger?

*Very Important	71.0%
Somewhat Important	20.4
Unimportant	7.8
No Opinion, No Answer	.8
	100.0

How important is helping to raise the standard of living in underdeveloped countries?

*Very Important	35.5
Somewhat Important	41.0
Unimportant	20.6
No Opinion, No Answer	2.9
	100.0

Should U.S. help underdeveloped countries improve their standard of living or not?

*Yes, Should	57.1
No, Should Not/Depends	40.0
No Opinion, No Answer	2.9
	100.0

Do you agree or disagree that the U.S. has exploited poorer countries by not paying a fair price for raw materials?

*Agree	32.1
Disagree	43.2
No Opinion, No Answer	24.7
	100.0

Would you be willing to help poorer countries by paying increased taxes?

*Yes, Would	30.2
No, Would Not	69.8
	100.0

Would you be willing to help poorer countries by contributing money directly?

*Yes, Would	53.4
No, Would Not	46.6
	100.0

Would you be willing to help poorer countries by reducing your own standard of living?

*Yes, Would	28.2
No, Would Not	71.8
	100.0

*Indicator of support for third world aid

FOREIGN POLICY GOALS AND VALUES

Our survey also probed alternative value orientations which might alter or even eventually supplant the present concerns over communism or the third world. For the most part, these questions related to the four attitude dimensions, mentioned earlier, as being advocated increasingly by foreign policy analysts of late. The four orientations and the character of the questions employed are:

1. *Democracy* — questions which revealed the respondent's concern about democratic vs. dictatorial rule in other countries and willingness to promote the ideals of democratic government in other countries.
2. *Interventionism* — support respondents give to the U.S. conducting both spying and covert interventionist activities in both communist and non-communist countries.
3. *Isolationism* — agreement with general statements about the wisdom of our withdrawing as much as possible from world affairs and commitments overseas.
4. *Self-interest* — importance respondents gave to ensuring that American foreign policy did not lose sight of the interests of our own citizens.

The overall responses to each of the questions asked are shown in Tables 3 and 4.

Self-Interest

Of these four value areas, the greatest public support was clearly given to self-interest. For example, in their ratings of ten specific goals of foreign policy, the public put "protecting the jobs of American workers" at the top of the list. Its 80% rating as very important was even higher than that accorded "keeping peace in the world," which 74% of the sample saw as very important. Further down this list was raising our own country's standard of living with 57% rating it as a very important goal of our *foreign* policy. In contrast, only 36% of the public saw raising the standard of living in less developed countries as a very important goal.

This primacy of concern with pragmatic or national self-interest values is also evident from replies to other questions in the survey. More respondents agreed with the policy of restricting our foreign aid to countries that "will do what we want them to do" (44%) than agreed with the policy of restricting aid to democratic countries (33%).

As for background factors, in this case our attitude index showed little difference in support for self-interest by age group or geography (Appendix Table B3). Nor did self-interest vary much by sex or across income groups. It did, however, vary with education. College graduates expressed far less national self-interest than those with a high school education or less. It is probably the "cosmopolitanism"

that goes along with advanced education that makes these statements of narrow self-interest less attractive to the college educated.

Isolationism

In contrast, only about a third of our respondents agreed with the items dealing with *isolationism* — that this country, or the rest of the world, would be "better off if we just stayed home," or that we should bring our troops home from Europe, Japan, or Korea, or that it was very important for the U.S. to worry about protecting weaker countries in the world. The isolationism inherent in these policies fell well short of attracting majority support. Nonetheless, these isolationist statements were attractive to a substantial minority of the public, which could grow to majority status in certain policy situations.

As was true for the national self-interest items, isolationist questions held greatest appeal for the less educated. Unlike self-interest, however, isolationism was also more popular among lower income groups and among women; these differences held up after control for education, age, and city (Appendix Table B3).

Despite their common correlation with education, their common emphasis on "domestic" concerns, and their common pattern of correlation with other attitude items (see below), it is surprising and important to find that feelings of national self-interest and isolationism related weakly to one another. That is, a person who was sympathetic to the pursuit of national self-interest was not much more likely to agree with isolationist statements than was a person less sympathetic to nationalist self-interest.

Interventionism and Democracy

There was, however, a strong and surprising connection between responses to the survey items dealing with our other two value dimensions, namely *democracy* and *interventionism*. The connection is surprising because we expected that support for democracy in other countries would be more attractive to those with more liberal and humanitarian and less "hard-line" world orientations. In fact, just the opposite occurred. People most supportive of international democracy also support intervening against communist groups, dictators, and aggressors.

Both values are least attractive to those under age 25 and to residents of San Francisco (Appendix Table B3). While college graduates are the least concerned of all education groups about the pursuit of democratic ideals abroad, they are just as likely as the less educated to support interventionist activities. More affluent people, on the other hand, are more supportive of interventionist activity than the less affluent, even though they are no more supportive of pursuing democratic ideals abroad. Possibly the risk-taking or adventuresome element accounts for the attractiveness of interventionist activities among those with higher income; perhaps this is also why interventionism has so much more appeal for men than for women. Interventionism may also imply a greater desire for control over "troublesome" coun-

**TABLE 3: SURVEY QUESTIONS
RELATED TO NATIONALIST
SELF-INTEREST AND ISOLATIONISM
(N=1500)**

SELF-INTEREST VALUE ITEMS

How important is raising this country's standard of living?

*Very Important.	56.5%
Somewhat Important.	24.8
Unimportant.	16.9
No Opinion, No Answer.	1.9
	100.0

How important is protecting the jobs of American workers here in the U.S.?

*Very Important.	80.2
Somewhat Important.	13.5
Unimportant.	4.9
No Opinion, No Answer.	1.4
	100.0

Do you agree or disagree with the statement "The U.S. should give aid only to those countries that will help do what we want in the world"?

*Agree.	43.6
Disagree.	50.7
No Opinion, No Answer.	5.7
	100.0

ISOLATIONISM ITEMS

Do you agree or disagree with the statement "This country would be better off if we stayed home"?

*Agree.	31.8%
Disagree.	63.1
No Opinion, No Answer.	5.1
	100.0

Do you agree or disagree with the statement "The rest of the world would be better off if we stayed home"?

*Agree.	25.8
Disagree.	68.9
No Opinion, No Answer.	5.3
	100.0

Do you feel we should keep troops in Japan or bring them home?

Troops Should Be Kept There.	54.1
*Bring The Troops Home.	36.8
No Opinion, No Answer.	9.2
	100.0

Do you feel we should keep troops in Europe or bring them home?

Troops Should Be Kept There.	61.8
*Bring The Troops Home.	30.1
No Opinion, No Answer.	8.2
	100.0

Do you feel we should keep troops in Korea or bring them home?

Troops Should Be Kept There.	55.9
*Bring The Troops Home.	36.0
No Opinion, No Answer.	8.1
	100.0

*Indicator of self-interest in world affairs

*Indicator of isolationism

**TABLE 4: ATTITUDE QUESTIONS DEALING WITH
DEMOCRACY ABROAD AND INTERVENTIONISM.**

DEMOCRACY ABROAD ITEMS

How important is stopping the spread of dictatorships?

*Very Important	47.5%
Somewhat Important	28.0
Unimportant	21.4
No Opinion, No Answer	3.1
	100.0

How important is persuading other countries to be more democratic?

*Very Important	30.1
Somewhat Important	35.4
Unimportant	30.1
No Opinion, No Answer	4.4
	100.0

*Indicator of support of democracy abroad

Do you agree or disagree with the statement "The U.S. should give aid only to those countries that have democratic governments"?

*Agree	32.7
Disagree	61.4
No Opinion, No Answer	5.9
	100.0

Do you agree or disagree with the statement "The U.S. should make alliances only with countries that have democratic governments"?

*Agree	27.5
Disagree	64.5
No Opinion, No Answer	8.0
	100.0

INTERVENTIONISM ITEMS

Should U.S. be spending more, less or the same as it is right now on the military budget?

*Spend More Money	23.5%
Spend Same Money	30.3
Spend Less Money	38.4
No Opinion, No Answer	7.8
	100.0

Should U.S. help a group trying to overthrow a government unfriendly to this country (secretly)?

*Should	19.4
Should Not	73.5
Don't Know, No Answer	7.1
	100.0

Should U.S. help a group fighting a group backed by communist countries (secretly)?

*Should	29.2
Should Not	63.8
Don't Know, No Answer	7.0
	100.0

Should U.S. help a group that wants to overthrow a communist government (secretly)?

*Should	29.1
Should Not	62.7
Don't Know, No Answer	8.2
	100.0

Should U.S. help others overthrow a dictatorship unfriendly to this country (secretly)?

*Should	28.6
Should Not	62.2
Don't Know, No Answer	9.2
	100.0

*Indicator of interventionism or militarism

Should U.S. maintain secret spies in communist countries?

*Should	78.6
Should Not	15.2
Don't Know, No Answer	6.2
	100.0

Should U.S. maintain secret spies in countries that the CIA thinks might one day cause trouble for the U.S.?

*Should	71.3
Should Not	20.7
Don't Know, No Answer	8.0
	100.0

Should U.S. maintain secret spies in friendly countries?

*Should	53.3
Should Not	40.0
Don't Know, No Answer	5.7
	100.0

How important is stopping wars between small countries?

*Very Important	28.6
Somewhat Important	30.7
Unimportant	37.3
No Opinion, No Answer	3.4
	100.0

How important is protecting weaker countries against foreign aggression?

*Very Important	28.0
Somewhat Important	44.5
Unimportant	21.7
No Opinion, No Answer	5.8
	100.0

tries by the more affluent, who it will be remembered were less supportive of the general goals of stopping communism (Chapter 2).

Again, Table 4 shows that neither value currently commands the support of many Americans in this survey. In the case of democracy, less than a third of respondents (30%) saw persuading other countries to be more democratic to be a very important goal of our foreign policy; only police action in wars between small countries was seen as less important. Roughly the same percentages agreed that we should restrict our foreign aid to democratic governments (33%) or that we should restrict our alliances to democratic governments (28%). Even less support existed for making trade with the U.S.S.R. contingent on the Soviets' acting more democratically at home. Americans appear to have become disillusioned about what at least rhetorically had been an important foreign policy objective 15 to 20 years ago. Perhaps, Watergate and Vietnam have made us aware of our own limitations to effect these principles of democracy both at home and overseas.

If anything, the public is even less enthusiastic about foreign military activities than about the pursuit of democracy. Fewer than 25% support increased military spending. In addition, "stopping wars between small countries" and "protecting weaker countries against aggression" were rated at the bottom of the list of ten foreign policy goals given to respondents, drawing ratings of "very important" from only 29% and 28% of the sample respectively. Even less support was evident for conducting secret interventionist activities in other countries: only 19% supported the use of covert methods to overthrow unfriendly governments. Support increased, but still to less than 30% for U.S. secret help to groups in other countries attempting to overthrow communist governments. About the same percentage felt the U.S. should help fight communist-backed groups in a non-communist country.

On the other hand, the public strongly supports secret spying activities in other countries. Greater support is found for spying in communist countries (a 5 to 1 ratio of support to opposition) and spying in countries identified by the CIA as potential troublemakers (3.4 to 1 support) than for spying on friendly countries (1.3 to 1 support). The public makes a clear distinction between its support of intelligence gathering activities in another country and its disapproval of covert subversive activities.

Significance of the Four Attitudes

Only one of the four new orientations, national self-interest, has substantial support among the public. It would appear that our government's policies vis-a-vis the communist nations and the third world will increasingly be evaluated on the basis of our self-interest. If a response or an initiative is seen to work clearly to our benefit, it will probably be acceptable regardless of how much the citizenry may be suspicious of the Soviets or sympathetic toward third world change.

Somewhere between a quarter and a third of the public support the other three orientations — isolationism, democ-

racy, and interventionism. As of yet, they thus do not appear to have the strength of appeal to have a long run influence on elections and policy making. Their impact is more likely to be intermittent, and stimulated by particularly explicit self-interest situations. In such contexts, particularly if a highly publicized crisis occurs, any one of the three could become dominant. In the early seventies, for instance, the widespread desire for withdrawal from Vietnam provided a climate in which isolationism appeared more attractive. As insignificant a military threat as the Mayaguez incident generated immediate (but temporary) public support for interventionism. In addition, each of the three minority orientations now attract enough support to affect public policy thinking in the dominant areas of communism and the third world — a topic to which we now turn.

Relation with Soviet and Third World Attitudes

In relating the four value dimensions to the public's attitudes toward the Soviet Union and toward third world countries, we were particularly interested in the clustering of attitudes along a "hard line"-"soft line" dimension. We had initially expected that the hard line would be best represented by the items dealing with interventionism (or militarism) and least represented by the democracy items, with self-interest and isolationism falling in the middle. Instead, however, we found that both the interventionism and the democracy values were significantly correlated with hard-line or negative attitudes toward the Soviet Union. That is, people who supported more venturesome interventionist policies were more likely to want to see democracy practiced in other countries, and both groups were more inclined to be wary of, if not hostile toward, the Soviet Union.

Whether values of venturesomeness or democracy lead one to take a negative attitude toward the Soviet Union or whether anti-Soviet attitudes lead one to espouse interventionist tactics or to place greater value on democracy cannot be determined from the data at hand. It is clear, however, that these three sets of attitudes do coalesce in public thinking more strongly than any other pattern of foreign policy attitudes examined in this survey. In other words, if we know that a person places a high value on interventionism or commitment to democracy as a form of government in other countries, we have very good reason to believe that person's attitudes toward the Soviet Union will be negative or hard-line as well. We also have good reason to believe that the person is over age 50 and has less education.

On the other hand, hard-line positions on the interventionism or democracy scales gave little clue to the person's attitudes toward third world countries. This is true despite the finding (noted earlier) that hard-line attitudes on the Soviet Union clearly predicted to a less sympathetic orientation toward third world countries as well. The reason for this difference across related attitude areas is not clear, but it is but one of many examples of the paradoxes of foreign policy attitudes found in these data, a topic we discuss in more detail in the final section.

The two "domestic" values — national self-interest and isolationism — were more closely related to third world attitudes than were the values of interventionism and democ-

racy. As one would expect, nationalist and isolationist individuals were less supportive of foreign aid. People who held all three attitudes had one background characteristic in common, namely low education.

National self-interest was also related to hard-line attitudes toward the Soviet Union, as one might expect given the common perception that we have gained little for ourselves from our past dealings with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, isolationists also had less negative attitudes toward the Soviet Union, indicating that isolationism as defined by our items does not extend to more negative views of other countries generally.

Analyzing the responses to these four values thus has helped us to verify and flesh out some of the thinking behind public attitudes toward the Soviet Union and third world countries. The anti-Soviet constituency is more clearly defined and is also tied into a wider set of related reasons than that segment of the public which lines up against extending aid to third world countries. Nonetheless, the linkages between these attitudes and values, as between as all our attitudes and values, are filled with ambiguities and in-

consistencies that make it impossible to treat public opinion as a single logical entity. Moreover, it is possible that we have left out value dimensions — e.g. those supportive of world government — which could lend support to aid to third world countries.

As further testimony to the complexity of relations between the six attitude dimensions, consider their correlations with a separate fundamental value in foreign policy — world peace. This goal was close to the top in the ratings given to ten such goals, with 74% of our sample rating it very important. One might suppose that this “soft” goal would be of greater concern among those with soft values (such as support for aid to third world countries) and of least concern among those with hard-line views (such as anti-Soviet attitudes or interventionist values). And in fact, this pattern did hold true. But there was one exception: persons who placed the greatest value on democracy also placed greater value on world peace than did any other group in the sample, which supports our initial expectation about the humanitarian nature of this dimension. At the same time, this group appears to support hard-line policies to achieve these soft-line goals.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The results of our 1976 surveys generally agree with the results of other recent national polls: the public is wary though optimistic about U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and gives positive though unenthusiastic support for aid to the third world.¹ We find in the public little of the isolationist sentiment that concerns some foreign policy experts (e.g. Brzezinski 1976), and which might have been expected as a logical consequence of U.S. foreign policy frustrations and misadventures over the last decade.

If anything, it is more accurate to describe these foreign policy attitudes as "activist" in character despite whatever problems this posture may have caused us in the recent past. There is majority sentiment not only for Soviet trade and for aid to third world countries, but also for maintaining our troop commitments in Western Europe, Japan, and Korea and our intelligence gathering activities, even to the extent of secretly spying on our allies.

The public's activism stops short of support for certain policies, however. Our surveys have identified an important split in support for various intelligence activities in other countries that deserves special attention. While few people oppose U.S. spying on other countries, less than a third of the public appears to support secret U.S. involvement in the internal political fighting in other countries, *even* if it is directed against communist forces. Spying perhaps has always been considered fair game in foreign affairs and the public supports its continued use, probably also because they perceive that other countries spy on us. They do appear to draw the line, however, at the type of CIA interventions in Chile and Italy that have come to light.

There are limits, then, to citizen support of activist foreign policies. Perhaps overriding all foreign policy values is pragmatism, as reflected in the extremely strong appeal of survey questions with an "America first" theme. It is pragmatism that appears to underlie our willingness to trade with the Soviet Union and even our lack of enthusiasm for encouraging the pursuit of democratic ideals in other countries (indeed our respondents seem far more committed to stopping the spread of communism than stopping the spread of dictatorships). Whether this strong sense of pragmatism comes as a result of Vietnam or has always been present cannot be determined from our data; but it is necessary for policy makers to recognize its presence.

The commitment to activism is also tempered by confusion and ambiguity about where our foreign policy has been headed. Several respondents stated in effect that they didn't understand what policy makers in Washington were doing. Particularly in contrast to the Soviet Union, they saw the U.S. as not having a foreign policy; rather, they believed

our decisions are determined by the interests of individual politicians or by special interest groups. This view is reinforced by the 60% in the surveys who agreed that "leaders in Washington don't care about what their foreign policies cost the American people."

Foreign Policy Publics

Our analysis has concentrated on divisions of opinion within the public because the public is not a unitary entity but is comprised of important "subpublics" with unique attitudes and values. We have emphasized these divisions because they are usually given minimal attention in reports of public opinion. We have found crucial divisions in opinion not only between the better educated and the less educated or between the young and the old, but also between people who espouse different foreign policy values.

The most intriguing segment of the public identified in this survey are those people who profess support of our vigorous pursuit of democratic ideals in foreign policy. People who supported statements to this effect took a much harder line on foreign policy issues than expected. We suspect there may be very little distinction between the terms "dictatorship" and "communism" for many citizens. The conditions under which the public makes a distinction between the two terms, as well as the public definition of the term "democracy," clearly need further study and elaboration.

The two major background factors that divide the public in the current surveys are *education* and *age*. Survey researchers have emphasized the importance of educational differences in public opinion, citing the fact that better-educated people have more structured "belief systems" or ideologies from which to offer more stable or more sophisticated political opinions — opinions that are coherent and well-reasoned enough to be intelligible to policy makers. Some researchers have gone so far as to suggest that surveys include information items to weed out members of the public whose opinions lack the information or thought to warrant serious consideration.

Other researchers argue that the better educated are distinguished mainly by virtue of their greater support of existing governmental policies (Gamson and Modigliani 1964), or through simple parroting of popular opinions expressed in the mass media (Wright 1972). Both views are partially supported in the present data by the college-exposed's more positive attitudes toward U.S.-Soviet relations and third world aid, and their more negative attitudes toward simple self-interest in foreign affairs — implicit policies of the (Ford) Administration that were not widely criticized by the media.

To be sure, we have found significant gaps in foreign policy opinions between college graduates and the rest of the public, and we could argue that these opinions (or the opinions of the cosmopolitan or sophisticated San Franciscans) should be given greatest weight in evaluating public opinion. Evidence from a special Pittsburgh survey group, however, suggests that an even more crucial factor in public opinion is not simple graduation from college, but graduation from an "elite" college (Wilensky 1963; Converse 1964) or subsequent moves to elite occupations (Robinson and Jacobson

¹See, for example, the data collected and analyzed by Potomac Associates (1976), the Public Agenda Foundation (1976), and Harris (1975).

1968), or membership in elite associations. Such an elite sample was drawn in Pittsburgh from the list of invited speakers and participants to that town meeting. This sample consisted of international vice-presidents of large corporations and banks, heads of voluntary associations concerned with foreign affairs, and academics with foreign policy expertise.

The responses of this elite sample of 35 are compared with the responses of the public in Table 5. On only 3 of the 24 questions did the opinions of this elite group match that of the public: distrust of the Soviet Union, contingent Soviet trade, and the importance of stopping world hunger. Generally speaking, the elite took an even more activist orientation toward world affairs than the public generally, or than the college graduate segment of that public. This activism was particularly dramatic for Soviet trade, third world aid, and interventionism. The elite were also more active supporters of aid to and alliances with non-democracies. At the same time they were less interested in simply pursuing narrow national economic interests and in stopping the spread of communism or dictatorships. Instead, elite activism seemed directed toward developing an expanded world economy, a goal in which their self-interest more clearly resides.

These elites are important not only because they represent the most important "vested interests" in this country but also because they are better able to articulate their needs and attitudes to Washington policy makers than the general lay public. While the Pittsburgh elite were probably more conservative than other elite groups that could be identified, no study of public opinion would be complete without their adequate representation.

Age seems to be an even more important dividing line in the public than education. It is a factor that has been disregarded in the last few years, perhaps because too much was made of it in the 1960's. Despite all that was written about the "generation gap" of the 1960's, survey researchers had a difficult time finding solid evidence for it in public opinion surveys at the time (Robinson 1970; Meyer 1972). In contrast, we have provided significant evidence of a serious generation gap on each foreign policy scale. In each instance, younger people are much less "hard line" than older people; they are less anti-Soviet, more sympathetic toward the third world, less interventionist, less isolationist, and less pragmatic. The progression, moreover, tends to be steadily accumulating; that is, people under 25 are even less hard-line than those 25-34, i.e. that group which during the 1960's was under the important boundary age of 30.² Corroborating evidence of these trends in world orientations

²Some interesting reversals in this trend, however, appear on two of the values and attitudes when a more refined age breakout is performed. Although the sample sizes become very small, those aged 18-20 are more isolationist and less sympathetic to third world countries than those aged 21-24. While this may signify the coming of a more conservative generation on these two issues, a reversion to conservatism is not found on the other four value and attitude dimensions, with the 18-20 group being dramatically less interventionist than the 21-24 group. It is particularly on the scales dealing with international conflict, then, that the younger people differ so widely from their parents.

among young adults appears in other community surveys sponsored by the Kettering Foundation, as described in Appendix C.

Such age differences are pronounced enough that some future international developments could generate a more serious generational split in this country than appeared during the Vietnam period. To the extent that this event involves U.S.-Soviet attitudes or interventionist activities, the split could be very critical, since it is the young who are usually called on to bear the brunt of our international conflicts. Those who favor a more active military role for the U.S. in world affairs should be aware that such a policy could well entail severe recruitment and morale problems on the part of the age segment most needed in the trenches.

The Problems of Foreign Policy Surveys

Our impressions are necessarily limited by the data collection method we used. Like most public opinion polls on foreign policy, ours employed structured, "closed-ended" attitude questions. We are acutely aware, however, of the limitations of this approach. People do not respond to closed-ended questions with their own words or meanings. Different people can agree or disagree with specific attitude statements for quite different reasons or from quite different information bases. Many people have trouble understanding or deciphering what the specific survey question is about, particularly in as complex an area as foreign relations.³

Our analysis has focused on the most consistent and coherent conclusions that can be found in such data. Even more striking, however, are the glaring inconsistencies that emerge when the attitude questions are cross-tabulated with one another. We have noted the following ambiguities and inconsistencies in the course of this report:

- The puzzling responses of people who support democracy in other countries: while taking a hard-line on the Soviet Union and the use of interventionist policies, they are notably more interested in the "soft" goal of world peace than other people.
- The relation between attitudes toward the Soviet Union and toward the third world: they are negative-

³Given more ambiguous survey items, the survey research literature suggests that people will depend on irrelevant cues for responding to questions, like trying to please the interviewer or giving the response that will arouse the least suspicion or require the least mental work. Many of our items are open to such "response sets" on the part of the public, such as the tendency of people simply to agree with opinion statements that are in agree-disagree format. Since few of our items in this format attracted majority agreement, the problem of inflated agreement may be less crucial here. The more serious problem with agreement response set is its correlation with the demographic factor of education (Hyman and Sheatsley 1954; Lenski and Leggett 1959). Less-educated respondents, who are usually those with the haziest and least informed attitudes on public opinion issues, are those found to be in most agreement with attitude statements. Our separate analyses to control for this explanation of the results suggest it plays some role but does not totally invalidate the conclusions we have reported in previous chapters. One reason is that the items suspected of being open to response set are mixed together with items in other format in the attitude scale dimensions we created for analysis.

TABLE 5: DIFFERENCES IN INTERNATIONAL ATTITUDES
ACROSS MASS AND ELITE SAMPLES

(Entries are percentages agreeing with each statement)

	Pittsburgh Mass (N=340)	Pittsburgh Elite (N=35)
U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS		
U.S. cannot trust the Soviet Union	67	66
U.S. has mainly benefited from detente	6	14
Keep well ahead of U.S.S.R. militarily	51	29
Support U.S. - Soviet trade	61	88
Make trade contingent on Soviet politics	24	20
Trade on credit with Soviet Union	26	62
U.S. AND THE THIRD WORLD		
U.S. should help less developed countries	64	92
Willing to pay more taxes to help	30	80
Willing to contribute money to help	51	89
Willing to reduce standard of living to help	19	60
U.S. does not pay fair price for raw materials from poor countries	16	46
U.S. should only aid democracies	32	9
U.S. should only be allied with democracies	26	3
U.S. INTERVENTION		
Keep U.S. troops in Europe	61	91
U.S. should spy on other countries	74	100
U.S. should engage in covert operations	29	54
U.S. would be better off staying home	26	0
U.S. has responsibility to keep world peace	73	83
VALUES (percent rating each goal "very important")		
Raising our own standard of living	60	26
Protecting the jobs of American workers	87	49
Always keeping our own interests first	63	34
Stopping world hunger	72	74
Stopping the spread of communism	64	29
Stopping the spread of dictatorship	50	26

ly related among younger, better-educated respondents and positively related among older, less-educated respondents.

- The failure of isolationists, as defined by our attitude questions, to oppose interventionist moves more than do non-isolationists.
- The failure of the two "domestic" attitude sets of isolationism and self-interest to coalesce to any significant degree: isolationist opinions were associated with more open policies toward relations with the Soviet Union, the reverse of the situation for self-interest.
- The failure of attitudes that relate to education (such as third world aid, anti-Soviet attitudes, democracy and self-interest) also to relate to income (such as isolationism and interventionism). Given the strong interrelation between a person's education and income, an attitude related to education will usually be related to income. In this study there was an actual divergence between these two factors in *each* of the six attitude areas examined.

In addition, there are innumerable puzzling relationships between the individual questions themselves — a willingness to trade with the Soviet Union among many people who feel that Soviets cannot be trusted, and a willingness to reduce military spending among many people who feel we should keep well ahead of the Soviet Union militarily, and so on.⁴

It is with these results in mind — along with the wide divisions in opinion by age and education — that we conclude that opinion polls which simply report percentages for and against a particular foreign policy position often do a serious disservice to an informed accounting of public opinion. Public opinion is made to look more structured, concerned and developed than it really is. It is not unreason-

able to expect that policy makers who operate on such misleading assumptions may take steps that actually work against the effect which is most likely to be supported by the public. In the case of Vietnam, for example, reports about domestic opposition to the Administration's policy were misleading since they did not detail the increasingly disheartened and ambivalent character of this opinion. While the articulate opposition was talking about international moral and legal issues, the public was far more concerned about the cost of the war in American lives and tax dollars and about the lack of any compelling reason for the U.S. to be involved in a foreign war which we were not winning (Schuman 1972).

Recent polls showing increased public support for defense and military spending may illustrate much the same problem in interpretation of closed-ended questions without open-ended follow-up questions to assess the reasons behind public opinion. Such a question was also put to our small sample in Pittsburgh, and the responses to the group fairly well match those reported in the national opinion polls — about 70% supported a maintained or increased military budget. However, our additional probes and follow-up questions with our samples revealed that these opinions were not strongly held. People in favor of increased military support tended to add "As long as the money is not wasted," or "As long as we're behind the Soviet Union," indicating that their support was conditional on key assumptions. At the same time, those in favor of decreased spending noted that their response was conditional on not falling behind the Soviet Union. In other words, those on both ends of the scale looked very much like those in the middle.

The lesson from our experience should be clear: poll data which use closed-ended questions not supported by follow-up probes or other ways of fleshing out the reasons behind these opinions are practically uninterpretable. More importantly, they can be grossly misleading when used for policy purposes.

⁴These failures of attitudes and values in the survey to coalesce becomes reinforced when one attempts to isolate types of foreign policy attitude holders through a statistical technique called Q-type factor analysis. While three types of attitude holders are reliably identified by the procedure, they cross-cut several of the dimensions we have already identified. For example, one type of individual supports isolationist statements and rejects spying activities, but accepts covert intervention in other countries. Another type of individual places high importance on stopping the spread of communism but rejects both spying and interventionist activities.

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APPENDIX A:

QUESTIONS AND QUESTION RESPONSES BY CITY

1. IMPORTANT GOALS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY.

	TOTAL	San Francisco	Portland	Minnesota	Milwaukee	Pittsburgh
Total Respondents.	1506	309	306	300	292	299
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

I'm going to read off a list of things that some people think are important for this country to achieve, or that other people think are not very important as American foreign policy goals. As I read each of these I'd like you to tell me whether you think it's an important goal for this country, or not. That is, is it very (important), (unimportant), or only somewhat (important) (unimportant) -

1. Stopping wars between small countries:

Very Important. (3)	431	56	80	83	117	95
	28.6	18.1	26.1	27.7	40.1	31.8
Somewhat Important. (2)	462	86	76	80	96	124
	30.7	27.8	24.8	26.7	32.9	41.5
Unimportant (1)	561	156	139	122	76	68
	37.3	50.5	45.4	40.7	26.0	22.7
No Opinion, No Answer	52	11	11	15	3	12
	3.5	3.6	3.6	5.0	1.0	4.0
Mean Score	1.91	1.66	1.80	1.86	2.14	2.09
Standard Deviation	.82	.78	.83	.84	.80	.75

2. Stopping the spread of dictatorships:

Very Important. (3)	716	113	142	170	139	152
	47.5	36.6	46.4	56.7	47.6	50.8
Somewhat Important. (2)	422	88	73	71	95	95
	28.0	28.5	23.9	23.7	32.5	31.8
Unimportant (1)	323	98	79	56	52	38
	21.4	31.7	25.8	18.7	17.8	12.7
No Opinion, No Answer	45	10	12	3	6	14
	3.0	3.2	3.9	1.0	2.1	4.7
Mean Score	2.27	2.05	2.21	2.38	2.30	2.40
Standard Deviation	.79	.83	.85	.79	.77	.71

3. Stopping the spread of communism:

Very Important. (3)	932	126	189	221	198	198
	61.9	40.8	61.8	73.7	67.8	66.2
Somewhat Important. (2)	294	68	57	42	56	71
	19.5	22.0	18.6	14.0	19.2	23.7
Unimportant (1)	244	100	55	30	35	24
	16.2	32.4	18.0	10.0	12.0	8.0
No Opinion, No Answer	36	15	5	7	3	6
	2.4	4.9	1.6	2.3	1.0	2.0
Mean Score	2.47	2.09	2.45	2.65	2.56	2.59
Standard Deviation	.75	.86	.76	.66	.71	.65

(Percentages Rounded)

1. IMPORTANT GOALS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (Continued).

	TOTAL	San Francisco	Portland	Minnesota	Milwaukee	Pittsburgh
Total Respondents.	1506 100.0	309 100.0	306 100.0	300 100.0	292 100.0	299 100.0
<i>Whether the following are important or unimportant goals (cont'd.) -</i>						
4. Stopping world hunger:						
Very Important. (3)	1070 71.0	227 73.5	199 65.0	226 75.3	216 74.0	202 67.6
Somewhat Important. (2)	307 20.4	62 20.1	68 22.2	52 17.3	51 17.5	74 24.7
Unimportant. (1)	117 7.8	18 5.8	36 11.8	21 7.0	21 7.2	21 7.0
No Opinion, No Answer.	12 .8	2 .6	3 1.0	1 .3	4 1.4	2 .7
Mean Score.	2.64	2.68	2.54	2.69	2.68	2.61
Standard Deviation.	.61	.58	.68	.57	.59	.61
5. Helping to raise the standard of living in underdeveloped countries:						
Very Important. (3)	535 35.5	122 39.5	101 33.0	117 39.0	96 32.9	99 33.1
Somewhat Important. (2)	617 41.0	114 36.9	118 38.6	120 40.0	127 43.5	138 46.2
Unimportant. (1)	310 20.6	67 21.7	78 25.5	55 18.3	62 21.2	48 16.1
No Opinion, No Answer.	44 2.9	6 1.9	9 2.9	8 2.7	7 2.4	14 4.7
Mean Score.	2.15	2.18	2.08	2.21	2.12	2.18
Standard Deviation.	.75	.77	.76	.74	.73	.69
6. Raising this country's standard of living:						
Very Important. (3)	851 56.5	159 51.5	181 59.2	158 52.7	171 58.6	182 60.9
Somewhat Important. (2)	373 24.8	80 25.9	67 21.9	88 29.3	73 25.0	65 21.7
Unimportant. (1)	254 16.9	69 22.3	56 18.3	50 16.7	44 15.1	35 11.7
No Opinion, No Answer.	28 1.9	1 .3	2 .7	4 1.3	4 1.4	17 5.7
Mean Score.	2.40	2.29	2.41	2.36	2.44	2.52
Standard Deviation.	.77	.81	.78	.76	.74	.71

(Percentages Rounded)

1. IMPORTANT GOALS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (Continued).

	TOTAL	San Francisco	Portland	Minnesota	Milwaukee	Pittsburgh
Total Respondents.	1506	309	306	300	292	299
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<i>Whether the following are important or unimportant goals (cont'd.) -</i>						
7. Keeping peace in the world:						
Very Important. (3)	1114	225	236	236	226	191
	74.0	72.8	77.1	78.7	77.4	63.9
Somewhat Important. (2)	268	45	48	39	47	89
	17.8	14.6	15.7	13.0	16.1	29.8
Unimportant (1)	107	35	21	22	14	15
	7.1	11.3	6.9	7.3	4.8	5.0
No Opinion, No Answer	17	4	1	3	5	4
	1.1	1.3	.3	1.0	1.7	1.3
Mean Score	2.68	2.62	2.70	2.72	2.74	2.60
Standard Deviation	.58	.69	.61	.59	.53	.56
8. Protecting the jobs of American workers here in the U.S.:						
Very Important. (3)	1208	233	244	241	229	261
	80.2	75.4	79.7	80.3	78.4	87.3
Somewhat Important. (2)	203	40	47	48	43	25
	13.5	12.9	15.4	16.0	14.7	8.4
Unimportant (1)	74	29	13	8	16	8
	4.9	9.4	4.2	2.7	5.5	2.7
No Opinion, No Answer	21	7	2	3	4	5
	1.4	2.3	.7	1.0	1.4	1.7
Mean Score	2.76	2.68	2.76	2.78	2.74	2.86
Standard Deviation	.54	.62	.51	.49	.54	.42
9. Persuading other countries to be more democratic:						
Very Important. (3)	454	72	88	108	77	109
	30.1	23.3	28.8	36.0	26.4	36.5
Somewhat Important. (2)	533	93	95	111	125	109
	35.4	30.1	31.0	37.0	42.8	36.5
Unimportant (1)	453	137	108	69	76	63
	30.1	44.3	35.3	23.0	26.0	21.1
No Opinion, No Answer	66	7	15	12	14	18
	4.4	2.3	4.9	4.0	4.8	6.0
Mean Score	2.00	1.78	1.93	2.14	2.00	2.16
Standard Deviation	.79	.81	.82	.75	.75	.77

(Percentages Rounded)

1. IMPORTANT GOALS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (Continued).

	TOTAL	San Francisco	Portland	Minnesota	Milwaukee	Pittsburgh
Total Respondents.	1506	309	306	300	202	299
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<i>Whether the following are important or unimportant goals -</i>						
10. Protecting weaker countries against foreign aggression:						
Very Important. (3)	421	70	81	102	76	92
	28.0	22.7	26.5	34.0	26.0	30.8
Somewhat Important (2)	670	128	139	121	142	140
	44.5	41.4	45.4	40.3	48.6	46.8
Unimportant (1)	327	98	70	58	54	47
	21.7	31.7	22.9	19.3	18.5	15.7
No Opinion, No Answer	88	13	16	19	20	20
	5.8	4.2	5.2	6.3	6.8	6.7
Mean Score	2.07	1.91	2.04	2.16	2.08	2.16
Standard Deviation	.71	.73	.71	.72	.68	.69

2. AGREE-DISAGREE: STATEMENTS ABOUT AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY.

	TOTAL	San Francisco	Portland	Minnesota	Milwaukee	Pittsburgh
Total Respondents.	1506 100.0	309 100.0	306 100.0	300 100.0	292 100.0	299 100.0
<i>I'm going to read you some comments we sometimes hear made about American foreign policy. For each statement, please tell me whether you agree with the comment or whether you disagree with it -</i>						
11. This country would be better off if we stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world:						
Agree	479 31.8	83 26.9	94 30.7	84 28.0	131 44.9	87* 29.1
Disagree.	950 63.1	208 67.3	191 62.4	200 66.7	158 54.1	193 64.5
No Opinion, No Answer	77 5.1	18 5.8	21 6.9	16 5.3	3 1.0	19 6.4
12. The rest of the world would be better off if we stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world:						
Agree	389 25.8	84 27.2	85 27.8	69 23.0	101 34.6	50 16.7
Disagree.	1037 68.9	205 66.3	207 67.6	214 71.3	181 62.0	230 76.9
No Opinion, No Answer	80 5.3	20 6.5	14 4.6	17 5.7	10 3.4	19 6.4
13. We cannot trust the Russians:						
Agree	883 58.6	145 46.9	176 57.5	183 61.0	181 62.0	198 66.2
Disagree.	464 30.8	131 42.4	101 33.0	91 30.3	82 28.1	59 19.7
No Opinion, No Answer	159 10.6	33 10.7	29 9.5	26 8.7	29 9.9	42 14.0
14. American leaders don't care how much their foreign policies cost the American people:						
Agree	899 59.7	165 53.4	180 58.8	170 56.7	150 51.4	234** 78.3
Disagree.	505 33.5	118 38.2	108 35.3	117 39.0	120 41.1	42 14.0
No Opinion, No Answer	102 6.8	26 8.4	18 5.9	13 4.3	22 7.5	23 7.7

(Percentages Rounded)

*Slight wording change

**American leaders don't pay enough attention to how much their foreign policies are going to cost the American people.

2. AGREE-DISAGREE: STATEMENTS ABOUT AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (Continued).

	TOTAL	San Francisco	Portland	Minnesota	Milwaukee	Pittsburgh
Total Respondents.	1506 100.0	309 100.0	306 100.0	300 100.0	292 100.0	299 100.0
<i>Whether agree or disagree with following statements about American foreign policy -</i>						
15. The U.S. should give aid only to those foreign countries that will help us do the things we want to do in the world:						
Agree	657 43.6	115 37.2	115 37.6	142 47.3	153 52.4	132 44.1
Disagree.	763 50.7	185 59.9	165 53.9	141 47.0	124 42.5	148 49.5
No Opinion, No Answer	86 5.7	9 2.9	26 8.5	17 5.7	15 5.1	19 6.4
16. The U.S. should give aid only to those foreign countries that have a democratic form of government:						
Agree	493 32.7	76 24.6	99 32.4	117 39.0	96 32.9	105 35.1
Disagree.	924 61.4	218 70.6	189 61.8	172 57.3	181 62.0	164 54.8
No Opinion, No Answer	89 5.9	15 4.9	18 5.9	11 3.7	15 5.1	30 10.0
17. The U.S. should make alliances only with those foreign countries that have a democratic form of government:						
Agree	414 27.5	74 23.9	88 28.8	94 31.3	84 28.8	74 24.7
Disagree.	971 64.5	218 70.6	188 61.4	190 63.3	184 63.0	191 63.9
No Opinion, No Answer	121 8.0	17 5.5	30 9.8	16 5.3	24 8.2	34 11.4

3. RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA.

	TOTAL	San Francisco	Portland	Minnesota	Milwaukee	Pittsburgh
Total Respondents.	1506 100.0	309 100.0	306 100.0	300 100.0	292 100.0	299 100.0
18. Do you feel relations between the United States and Russia are improving, getting worse, or are about the same as they have been?:						
Improving	399 26.5	116 37.5	108 35.3	95 31.7	80 27.4	— —
About the Same	582 38.6	148 47.9	149 48.7	152 50.7	133 45.5	— —
Getting Worse	137 9.1	22 7.1	30 9.8	38 12.7	47 16.1	— —
No Opinion, No Answer	89 5.9	23 7.4	19 6.2	15 5.0	32 11.0	— —

4. AMERICAN TRADE WITH RUSSIA.

	TOTAL	San Francisco	Portland	Minnesota	Milwaukee	Pittsburgh
Total Respondents.	150 ^a 100.0	309 100.0	306 100.0	300 100.0	292 100.0	299 100.0
19. Some people say that our farmers and businessmen should be able to trade with Russia as long as the goods are not used for military purposes. Other people say that our government should not allow Americans to trade with Russia at all. Which do you favor, American trade with Russia or no American trade with Russia?						
Favor Trade	1015 67.4	233 75.4	214 69.9	198 66.0	191 65.4	179 59.9
No Trade/Qualified	428 28.4	67 21.7	81 26.5	88 29.3	88 30.1	104 34.8
No Opinion, No Answer	63 4.2	9 2.9	11 3.6	14 4.7	13 4.5	16 5.4
Those who favor trade with Russia without qualifying it.	1015 67.4	233 75.4	214 69.9	198 66.0	191 65.4	179 59.9
20. Should we look at trade with Russia as strictly a business deal or should we sell to them only if they agree to act more democratically at home or more peacefully abroad?:						
Business Only	697 46.3	165 53.4	159 52.0	124 41.3	119 40.8	130 43.5
They should agree to act more democratically at home	257 17.1	56 18.1	45 14.7	62 20.7	53 18.2	41 13.7
No Opinion, No Answer	61 4.1	12 3.9	10 3.3	12 4.0	19 6.5	8 2.7
21. Should trading with Russia be on the same business terms as it is with non-communist countries, or should it be on more strict terms or more liberal terms?:						
More Strict/Cash	639 42.4	150 48.5	121 39.5	111 37.0	127* 43.5	130* 43.5
Same Terms/Depends.	247 16.4	71 23.0	77 25.2	78 26.0	20 6.8	1 .3
More Liberal/Credit	86 5.7	5 1.6	6 2.0	3 1.0	33 11.3	39 13.0
No Opinion, No Answer	24 1.6	7 2.3	10 3.3	6 2.0	1 .3	— —

(Percentages Rounded)

*Slight wording change

5. U.S. MILITARY POWER.

	TOTAL	San Francisco	Portland	Minnesota	Milwaukee	Pittsburgh
Total Respondents.	1506 100.0	309 100.0	306 100.0	300 100.0	292 100.0	299 100.0
22. How should U.S. military power compare to that of Russia? Should we try to be well ahead of them, should we try to keep about even, or is it alright if Russia gets ahead to some extent?						
U.S. Keep Well Ahead	624 41.4	94 30.4	118 38.6	125 41.7	135 46.2	152* 50.8
Keep Even With Russia.	690 45.8	153 49.5	142 46.4	142 47.3	129 44.2	124 41.5
Allow Russia To Get Ahead.	103 6.8	45 14.6	22 7.2	19 6.3	12 4.1	5 1.7
No Opinion, No Answer	89 5.9	17 5.5	24 7.8	14 4.7	16 5.5	18 6.0
23. Do you think the United States should be spending more money on its military budget, spending less money on the military budget, or spending about the same amount of money it is now?:						
Spend More Money	354 23.5	62 20.1	76 24.8	80 26.7	69 23.6	67* 22.4
Spend Less Money	578 38.4	94 30.4	131 42.8	129 43.0	113 38.7	111 37.1
Spend Same Money	457 30.3	131 42.4	71 23.2	64 21.3	92 31.5	99 33.1
No Opinion, No Answer	117 7.8	22 7.1	28 9.2	27 9.0	18 6.2	22 7.4

6. WHO HAS BENEFITED FROM DETENTE.

24. Detente means that there is a lessening of tensions between the two countries. Overall, would you say that the policy of detente has been of more benefit to the United States, more to Russia, or has it benefited both equally?:						
Has Benefited U.S. More	44 2.9	5 1.6	4 1.3	6 2.0	11 3.8	18 6.0
Has Benefited Russia More	632 42.0	141 45.6	135 44.1	124 41.3	92 31.5	140 46.8
Has Benefited Both Equally.	599 39.8	111 35.9	109 35.6	127 42.3	113 38.7	139 46.5
No Opinion, No Answer	231 15.3	52 16.8	58 19.0	43 14.3	76 26.0	2 0.7

(Percentages Rounded)

*Slight wording change

7. KEEP TROOPS IN FOLLOWING PLACES OR BRING THEM HOME.

	TOTAL	San Francisco	Portland	Minnesota	Milwaukee	Pittsburgh
Total Respondents.	1506	309	306	300	292	299
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

American troops are now stationed in a number of different places around the world, including Europe, South Korea, and Japan. As I name the place, please tell me whether you feel we should keep troops stationed there or bring them home --

25. Japan:

Troops Should Be Kept There	814	160	152	169	149	184*
	54.1	51.8	49.7	56.3	51.0	61.5
Bring The Troops Home	554	127	122	106	113	86
	36.8	41.1	39.9	35.3	38.7	28.8
No Opinion, No Answer	138	22	32	25	30	29
	9.2	7.1	10.5	8.3	10.3	9.7

26. Europe:

Troops Should Be Kept There	930	190	193	203	171	173*
	61.8	61.5	63.1	67.7	58.6	57.9
Bring The Troops Home	453	96	87	79	89	102
	30.1	31.1	28.4	26.3	30.5	34.1
No Opinion, No Answer	123	23	26	10	32	24
	8.2	7.4	8.5	6.0	11.0	8.0

27. South Korea:

Troops Should Be Kept There	842	160	167	185	154	176*
	55.9	51.8	54.6	61.7	52.7	58.9
Bring The Troops Home	542	123	111	95	115	98
	36.0	39.8	36.3	31.7	39.4	32.8
No Opinion, No Answer	122	26	28	20	23	25
	8.1	8.4	9.2	6.7	7.9	8.4

*Format change

8. SHOULD U.S. MAINTAIN SECRET SPIES.

	TOTAL	San Francisco	Portland	Minnesota	Milwaukee	Pittsburgh
Total Respondents.	1506 100.0	309 100.0	306 100.0	300 100.0	292 100.0	299 100.0
28. Do you think the U.S. should, or should not, maintain secret spy activities in communist countries?:						
Should	949 63.0	240 77.7	245 80.1	239 79.7	225 77.1	—
Should Not	184 12.2	47 15.2	40 13.1	44 14.7	53 18.2	—
Don't Know, No Answer.	74 4.9	22 7.1	21 6.9	17 5.7	14 4.8	—
29. Do you think the U.S. should, or should not, maintain secret spy activities in countries that the C.I.A. (Central Intelligence Agency) thinks might one day cause trouble for the U.S.?:						
Should	861 57.2	211 68.3	232 75.8	221 73.7	197 67.5	—
Should Not	250 16.6	75 24.3	48 15.7	52 17.3	75 25.7	—
Don't Know, No Answer.	96 6.4	23 7.4	26 8.5	27 9.0	20 6.8	—
30. Do you think the U.S. should, or should not, maintain secret spy activities in countries that are friendly to the U.S.?:						
Should	656 43.6	161 52.1	177 57.8	171 57.0	147 50.3	—
Should Not	483 32.1	135 43.7	103 33.7	113 37.7	132 45.2	—
Don't Know, No Answer.	68 4.5	13 4.2	26 8.5	16 5.3	13 4.5	—

(Percentages Rounded)

9. SHOULD U.S. HELP GROUPS TRYING TO OVERTHROW GOVERNMENTS.

	TOTAL	San Francisco	Portland	Minnesota	Milwaukee	Pittsburgh
Total Respondents.	1506 100.0	309 100.0	306 100.0	300 100.0	292 100.0	299 100.0
31. Do you think the U.S. should, or should not, secretly help a group that is trying to overthrow a government unfriendly to this country?:						
Should	234 15.5	47 15.2	63 20.6	61 20.3	63 21.6	—
Should Not	887 58.9	241 78.0	212 69.3	215 71.7	219 75.0	—
Don't Know, No Answer.	86 5.7	21 6.8	31 10.1	24 8.0	10 3.4	—
32. Do you think the U.S. should, or should not, secretly help a group that is fighting another group backed by communist countries?:						
Should	352 23.4	78 25.2	101 33.0	96 32.0	77 26.4	—
Should Not	770 51.1	207 67.0	178 58.2	180 60.0	205 70.2	—
Don't Know, No Answer.	85 5.6	24 7.8	27 8.8	24 8.0	10 3.4	—
33. Do you think the U.S. should, or should not, secretly help a group that wants to overthrow a communist government?:						
Should	351 23.3	59 19.1	89 29.1	108 36.0	95 32.5	—
Should Not	757 50.3	223 72.2	184 60.1	167 55.7	183 62.7	—
Don't Know, No Answer.	99 6.6	27 8.7	33 10.8	25 8.3	14 4.8	—
34. Do you think the U.S. should, or should not, secretly help others to overthrow a dictatorship unfriendly to this country?:						
Should	262 17.4	66 21.4	90 29.4	106 35.3	—	—
Should Not	570 37.8	216 69.9	183 59.8	171 57.0	—	—
Don't Know, No Answer.	83 5.5	27 8.7	33 10.8	23 7.7	—	—

(Percentages Rounded)

10. SHOULD U.S. HELP UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES.

	TOTAL	San Francisco	Portland	Minnesota	Milwaukee	Pittsburgh
Total Respondents.	1506 100.0	309 100.0	306 100.0	300 100.0	292 100.0	299 100.0
35. There are many countries in the world where the standard of living is much lower than in the United States. Do you think the United States should help these underdeveloped countries improve their standard of living or not?:						
Yes, Should	860 57.1	208 67.3	145 47.4	172 57.3	172 58.9	163* 54.5
No, Should Not/Depends	603 40.0	100 32.4	159 52.0	127 42.3	114 39.0	103 34.4
No Opinion, No Answer	43 2.9	1 .3	2 .7	1 .3	6 2.1	33 11.0
36. Many of these poor countries claim that the United States and other developed countries have exploited them by not paying a fair price for their raw materials. Do you agree or disagree with their point of view?:						
Agree	483 32.1	147 47.6	103 33.7	93 31.0	85 29.1	55** 18.4
Disagree.	651 43.2	100 32.4	110 35.9	139 46.3	130 44.5	172 57.5
No Opinion, No Answer	372 24.7	62 20.1	93 30.4	68 22.7	77 26.4	72 24.1
37. Some underdeveloped countries do not have natural resources to sell and need help to keep their people from starving. Would you be willing to help these countries in any of the following ways?:						
37. Paying Increased Taxes.	455 30.2	104 33.7	70 22.9	120 40.0	73 25.0	88 29.4
38. Contributing Money Directly.	804 53.4	178 57.6	148 48.4	140 46.7	178 61.0	160 53.5
39. Reducing Your Own Standard of Living	424 28.2	110 35.6	87 28.4	100 33.3	73 25.0	54 18.1
40. No to All Aid Responses.	516 34.3	91 29.4	113 36.9	109 36.3	77 26.4	126 42.1

(Percentages Rounded)

*Answered in Yes-No format.

**Asked for U.S. only; examples of motives given.

11. SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHICS

	TOTAL	San Francisco	Portland	Minnesota	Milwaukee	Pittsburgh
Total Respondents.	1506 100.0	309 100.0	306 100.0	300 100.0	292 100.0	299 100.0
41. What is your approximate age:						
18-20	67 4.4	21 6.8	11 3.6	4 1.3	18 6.2	13 4.3
21-24	151 10.0	36 11.7	30 9.8	24 8.0	32 11.0	29 9.7
25-34	400 26.6	99 32.0	83 27.1	80 26.7	72 24.7	66 22.1
35-49	356 23.6	66 21.4	76 24.8	74 24.7	78 26.7	62 20.7
50 & Older.	523 34.7	87 28.2	106 34.6	116 38.7	89 30.5	125 41.8
Refused.	9 .6	— —	— —	2 .7	3 1.0	4 1.3
42. We would like to have just a rough idea of your total annual family income so we can group people . . . just roughly, is your annual total family income over or under \$10,000? (If over \$10,000): is it over or under \$20,000?:						
Less than \$10,000	346 23.0	87 28.2	85 27.8	88 29.3	86 29.5	— —
\$10,000 to \$19,999	502 33.3	121 39.2	135 44.1	127 42.3	119 40.8	— —
\$20,000 and Over	291 19.3	89 28.8	63 20.6	73 24.3	66 22.6	— —
Don't Know/Refused	68 4.5	12 3.9	23 7.5	12 4.0	21 7.2	— —
43. What was the last grade of school you completed?:						
Up to 8 Years	97 6.4	9 2.9	19 6.2	27 9.0	18 6.2	24 8.0
9-11 Years	126 8.4	19 6.1	26 8.5	23 7.7	24 8.2	34 11.4
High School Graduate	552 36.7	87 28.2	104 34.0	113 37.7	124 42.5	124 41.5
Some College	495 32.9	145 46.9	126 41.2	101 33.7	68 23.3	55 18.4
College Graduate or More	226 15.0	49 15.9	31 10.1	32 10.7	52 17.8	62 20.7
No Answer.	10 .7	— —	— —	4 1.3	6 2.1	— —
44. Sex:						
Male	694 46.1	156 50.5	146 47.7	150 50.0	115 39.4	127 42.5
Female	801 53.2	153 49.5	160 52.3	150 50.0	171 58.6	167 55.9
No Answer.	11 .7	— —	— —	— —	6 2.1	5 1.7

(Percentages Rounded)

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APPENDIX B:

TABLES SHOWING DIFFERENCES IN FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES BY BACKGROUND FACTORS

**TABLE B1: DIFFERENCES IN ANTI-SOVIET ATTITUDES BY DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS
BEFORE AND AFTER ADJUSTMENT BY MULTIPLE
CLASSIFICATION ANALYSIS (Andrews et al. 1969)
(Higher scores represent a more anti-Soviet attitude)**

	Before Adjustment	After Adjustment
TOTAL AVERAGE SCORE	2.43	2.43
<i>Survey Site (N)</i>		
San Francisco (309)	1.83	1.92
Portland (306)	2.30	2.28
Minnesota (295)	2.61	2.53
Milwaukee (284)	2.61	2.63
Pittsburgh (295)	2.87	2.82
<i>Age</i>		
18-24 (218)	1.89	1.90
25-34 (400)	2.07	2.15
35-49 (354)	2.44	2.44
50 and over (517)	2.93	2.87
<i>Education</i>		
High School Incomplete (220)	2.80	2.48
High School Graduate (550)	2.62	2.58
Some College (493)	2.23	2.39
College Graduate (226)	2.08	2.10
<i>Income</i>		
Under \$10,000 (346)	2.53	2.46
\$10,000-19,000 (502)	2.41	2.45
\$20,000 and over (291)	2.35	2.36
<i>Sex</i>		
Male (694)	2.39	2.43
Female (801)	2.47	2.43

TABLE B2: DIFFERENCES ON THE THIRD WORLD SUPPORT SCALE BY DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS,
BEFORE AND AFTER ADJUSTMENT BY MCA.

	Before Adjustment	After Adjustment
TOTAL AVERAGE SCORE	3.08	3.08
<i>Survey Site (N)</i>		
San Francisco (309)	3.55	3.46
Portland (306)	2.79	2.78
Minnesota (295)	3.23	3.28
Milwaukee (284)	3.06	3.09
Pittsburgh (295)	2.76	2.80
<i>Age</i>		
18-24 (218)	3.41	3.40
25-34 (400)	3.27	3.17
35-49 (354)	3.24	3.21
50 and over (517)	2.68	2.79
<i>Education</i>		
High School Incomplete (220)	2.69	2.84
High School Graduate (550)	2.89	2.91
Some College (493)	3.29	3.20
College Graduate (226)	3.52	3.49
<i>Income</i>		
Under \$10,000 (346)	2.98	3.10
\$10,000-19,000 (502)	3.11	3.07
\$20,000 and over (291)	3.15	3.06
<i>Sex</i>		
Male (694)	3.10	3.07
Female (801)	3.06	3.09

TABLE B3:
DIFFERENCES ON THE FOUR VALUE SCALES AFTER ADJUSTMENT BY MCA



	Aid Democracies	Interventionism	Isolationism	Pragmatism
TOTAL AVERAGE SCORE	1.38	3.62	1.82	1.80
<i>Survey Site (N)</i>				
San Francisco (309)	1.18	3.19	2.03	1.71
Portland (306)	1.36	3.77	1.88	1.76
Minnesota (295)	1.57	3.87	1.63	1.77
Milwaukee (284)	1.36	3.50	2.03	1.88
Pittsburgh (295)	1.44	3.78	1.53	1.89
<i>Age</i>				
18-24 (218)	1.10	3.34	1.90	1.63
25-34 (400)	1.27	3.53	1.66	1.80
35-49 (354)	1.32	3.65	1.70	1.79
50 and over (517)	1.62	3.78	2.10	1.88
<i>Education</i>				
High School Incomplete (220)	1.65	3.33	2.03	2.08
High School Graduate (550)	1.58	3.70	1.88	1.97
Some College (493)	1.21	3.63	1.69	1.63
College Graduate (226)	1.00	3.64	1.79	1.48
<i>Income</i>				
Under \$10,000 (346)	1.37	3.40	2.10	1.86
\$10,000-19,000 (502)	1.37	3.70	1.78	1.81
\$20,000 and over (291)	1.28	3.73	1.56	1.71
<i>Sex</i>				
Male (694)	1.30	4.11	1.64	1.77
Female (801)	1.38	3.18	1.98	1.83

APPENDIX C:

PERCEPTUAL MAPS OF THE WORLD:

SOME 1964-1973 COMPARISONS

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Data from a separate Kettering Foundation public opinion project suggests that the age differences reported in these surveys (see Appendix B Tables) reflect a profoundly different orientation toward the outside world among younger people, rather than a transitory phenomenon. The Kettering Foundation's International Awareness project collected data on perceptions of foreign countries from almost 1000 residents in four Midwestern cities in 1973 (Detroit, Findlay and Marion, Ohio; Sioux City, Iowa). These perceptual data are a unique type of survey data in that problems of question wording are kept to a minimum. Respondents in the survey were simply given a list of 17 countries and asked to make judgments about how "similar" the various countries were to each other, the definition of similarity being left to each respondent. The point of the exercise was to see what international dimensions of similarity people would bring to bear to complete this unstructured task.

The task had been found to generate fascinating "maps of the world" in a 1964 study of Detroit on foreign policy public opinion (Robinson and Hefner 1968). The map in Figure 1 portrays the general character of this perceptual map, which was found to be common among fairly diverse segments of the Detroit public in 1964 — rich and poor, male and female, and better educated and less educated, as well as young and old. Figure 1 portrays a public map of the world which divides it mainly into three camps — Western capitalist, communist and third world. Fundamental to these groups is the main organizing political (horizontal) dimensions of capitalism vs. communism.*

By 1973, these perceptual maps had undergone a significant change, with the under age 30 segment of the public being now quite distinct. The map of the under 30 group is shown in Figure 2. Note that the relative distance between the U.S. and Russia in Figure 2 is much shorter than it was in Figure 1, when the two countries practically represented the polar extremes in perceptual distance. The maps thus reflect the fact that over 40% of young adults perceived Russia and the U.S. as similar in 1973, compared to less than 15% of young adults a decade earlier.

In contrast, the over 50 age group in this 1973 sample generated a map more similar to Figure 1 than to Figure 2. These two age groups, then, differed fundamentally in their view of the nature of the world. While the older generation continued to employ essentially a cold war map, younger adults saw the world as divided more clearly on the basis of economic development or world power, with the U.S. and Russia, and to a lesser extent Japan and China, being far more similar to one another than any was to India, Nigeria, or the Philippines.

One of the more interesting differences between Figure 1 and Figure 2 concerns the position of the Philippines, which moves from something of a U.S. satellite or protectorate in Figure 1 and closer to a third world country in Figure 2; much the same characterizes younger adult perceptions of Argentina and Brazil.

*In contrast, a group of academic foreign affairs experts interviewed at the same time generated a map that was radically different in character, with the fundamental horizontal dimension being economic development rather than political character or allegiance. The public map in 1973 tended to resemble that of the academics in 1964 more than that of the public in 1964. In other words, academic perceptions in 1964 turned out to be something of a "leading indicator" of subsequent public perceptions.

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